Messi Buys Eldense: How a 39-Year-Old Star Became the Owner of a Relegation Battle
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi** Lionel Messi đã mua 100% cổ phần CLB Eldense, đội đứng thứ 19 Segunda Division, từ một nhóm đầu tư Colombia với giá không công bố. Đây là CLB thứ hai anh sở hữu sau UE Cornella, phản ánh xu hướng cầu thủ đang thi đấu đầu tư đa CLB. **Dữ kiện chính** - Messi mua 100% cổ phần Eldense, CLB thành lập năm 1921, từ nhóm đầu tư Colombia. - Eldense xếp thứ 19 Segunda Division và thua 4 trong 7 trận gần nhất. - Giá thương vụ không được công bố; cả hai bên giữ kín con số. - Đây là CLB thứ hai Messi sở hữu, sau UE Cornella mua tháng 4. - Messi, 39 tuổi, vẫn thi đấu cho Inter Miami và có cú đá phạt được đề cử Puskas. **Nguồn** Thông cáo CLB Eldense và phân tích thị trường chuyển nhượng, ngày 13 tháng 8 năm 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan** Q: Messi hiện sở hữu bao nhiêu CLB? A: Hai CLB — UE Cornella (mua tháng 4) và Eldense. Q: Eldense đang ở vị trí nào trên bảng xếp hạng? A: Thứ 19 Segunda Division, nằm trong nhóm nguy cơ xuống hạng; chỉ số chiều sâu đội hình có thể tham chiếu tại VangBong.vn Player Depth Index. Q: Vì sao giá thương vụ không được công bố? A: Giao dịch CLB tư nhân không buộc phải công khai sổ sách, nên mọi con số lan truyền đều là suy đoán.
That night the ball sat at a narrow angle on the left side of the goal, about eighteen metres from the post, almost no shooting angle left. Lionel Messi placed it down, stepped back three paces, and sent it through a gap I had to watch three times to believe. The strike was later nominated for the FIFA Puskas Award. At 39, his left foot still does things most young players would not dare attempt.
But what kept me at my desk in Turin that night was not the shot. It was a short line of news that appeared the same week: Messi bought 100% of the shares in Eldense, a club sitting 19th in Spain's Segunda Division. The same name, two completely different stories — one on the pitch, one on paper.
This is the second club Messi owns. In April he had bought UE Cornella, another small Spanish club. The Eldense deal was closed with a Colombian investment group, and neither side disclosed the value. Eldense was founded in 2026, nearly a century of existence, now near the bottom of Segunda, having lost 4 of their last 7 matches, fighting to avoid relegation.

The club's statement uses exactly the language every statement uses: “a promising new chapter.” In ten years covering the transfer market, I have read hundreds of lines like it. They have never told me anything about a balance sheet.
The interesting part is the model. More and more active stars are becoming club owners — a multi-club ownership trend that European football finance watches closely. The model is not new: many groups own chains of clubs across Europe and South America, sharing scouting, medical and data systems. What is new here is that an active player is the named owner, rather than an anonymous investment fund. Messi's difference: he did not buy a top-flight club for show, but two small clubs in Spain's lower tiers. That is a calculated choice, and the calculation is what needs dissecting.
Based on my experience watching Segunda matches across several seasons, I keep seeing the same rule: lower-tier clubs do not die from a lack of stars, they die from a lack of steady cash flow. A rich owner does not automatically fix a revenue structure, but a global brand can change it.
Let us start with the story few want to tell: why would a Colombian investment group sell a club they had just taken over?
A club sitting 19th out of 22 in Segunda is not a profit-making asset. It is an asset leaking money. Segunda lives on proportionally shared broadcast revenue, shirt sponsorship, and gate receipts. A bottom-table club loses all three: low broadcast money, sponsors pulling out, empty stands. As cash flow shrinks, wages and player-contract amortisation still have to be paid in full. That gap is the loss.
In the FFP risk model I built from the 2026-20 season — when I dug into Juventus' financial reports while Serie A froze for COVID — I always separate two pressures. Liquidity pressure: is there cash to pay wages now. Compliance pressure: are you over the federation's spending ceiling. A bottom-table Segunda club usually collapses from the first. The Colombian owners most likely saw it before the market reacted.
So what did Messi buy? He did not buy a healthy club. He bought a name with history, an operating licence inside Spanish football, and — most importantly — a valuation that has been compressed.
A player's value only exists until someone dares to pay. The same goes for a club. A 19th-place team has no listed market price; its price is the number the seller accepts in a closed negotiation. That neither side disclosed the figure is no accident — it is the norm for private club deals, where the books are not required to be public.
This is where I want to pause longer than mass media allows. Numbers do not lie, but the people who give you the numbers always have motives. With no published price, nobody outside the negotiation room knows how much Eldense owes, how negative its working capital is, or what Messi actually paid. Every figure that circulates afterwards is speculation wearing the label of news.
At 39, an attacking player typically loses around a third of his sprint speed from his peak. What tends to remain is decision-making and set-piece technique — exactly the two qualities behind that narrow-angle free kick. That is the data explaining why Messi is still Puskas-nominated, and also the data explaining why he cannot play a single Eldense match himself.
Read the deal through the lens of a brand asset and the logic sharpens. Messi has a media empire stretching from the Americas (Inter Miami, MLS) to Europe. Eldense and Cornella give him two footholds in Spain at a fraction of the operating cost of a La Liga club. The Messi brand can pull sponsors, pull crowds, pull views — things a Segunda club could never generate on its own.
There is a second, quieter possibility: a talent pipeline. Cornella and Eldense are both small, both in Spain, both able to take in young players or South American players through Messi's network. This is a model many football groups have built — buying several clubs across tiers, using lower-tier clubs as a launchpad for young talent. I have no evidence of a specific plan, and I will not claim I do.
What I can say: the timing of the deal says a lot. A 19th-place team that has lost 4 of 7 always sells cheaper than a mid-table one. Buying in a panic is always cheaper than buying in calm.
But here is the blind spot the official story does not want you to see.
A three-minute phone call can kill a three-month negotiation. And a three-minute signature on a deed cannot fix a defence leaking goals over three months.
The media is selling you the image of “a superstar rescuing a historic club.” But the league table does not read press releases. Eldense still lose, still sit 19th, and now carry the added pressure of a globally famous owner. Players do not run faster because the owner is Messi; they are only watched more closely.
There are three specific risks I am tracking. Old debt: when an investment group exits, it often leaves unpaid financial obligations, and with no financial disclosure nobody can verify them. Divided focus: Messi is still an active player at Inter Miami, and a 39-year-old both playing and running two clubs on two continents has a finite budget of time.
The third risk is rarely mentioned: regulation. An active player owning clubs under a foreign federation may raise disclosure questions with MLS. In Spain, owning two clubs in the same federation does not break rules as long as they do not compete in the same division. But if Cornella and Eldense meet in the Copa del Rey, a conflict-of-interest story appears, and the rules will have to speak.
I learned, from nights reading Football Leaks data at 17 in Hanoi, that a contract has three truths: the seller's, the buyer's, and the writer's. Here, the seller's truth is a club bleeding; the buyer's truth is a brand asset; the writer's truth is a nice headline. Those three truths never fully match.
What is worth tracking is not who sits in the president's chair, but Eldense's next five matches. If the losing run continues, this deal turns from “a promising new chapter” into “a famous owner who could not save the club.” If the club survives, we will have a new model to study: a star half-retired, half-owner.
For Vietnamese football, this deal is a signal worth watching for domestic investors. When an active player can own a European club, the wall between player and owner blurs. V.League clubs own a name, a licence and a loyal fanbase — assets that could be revalued if foreign capital takes notice.
And when the Eldense stands fall silent on a rainy January afternoon, we will know who truly pays for football — not the person who signs the contract, but the person who still buys the ticket.
