V.League 2027: Expanding to 16-18 Clubs - The Quantity vs. Quality Dilemma
**Core answer**: V.League's plan to expand to 16-18 clubs by 2027 faces severe financial sustainability and governance risks, as current clubs already struggle with licensing and solvency. The binding constraint is not the number of clubs but the number of financially healthy clubs. **Key facts**: - HAGL received 2,000 billion VND over 20 years but declined for a decade, showing governance issues beyond funding. - Quang Nam withdrew after avoiding relegation; Thanh Hoa nearly collapsed and was rescued by local authorities. - In 2023, two clubs were penalized; in 2026, two clubs received conditional licenses – a 10-15% non-compliance rate. - Regional benchmarks: Thailand 16 clubs/30 rounds, Malaysia 12, Indonesia 18, Japan 20/38 rounds, South Korea 12/38 rounds via split format. - Expansion to 18 clubs would add 8 rounds and require 4 more solvent clubs, but no new revenue sources are identified. **Source attribution**: Analysis from V.League commentary, published August 13, 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: Q: Can V.League increase matches without expanding? A: Yes, by adopting a split format like South Korea, keeping 14 clubs but adding 6-8 rounds. Q: What is the main financial risk of expansion? A: Adding clubs with weak budgets would increase the number of non-compliant clubs and risk mid-season withdrawals. Q: How does licensing affect expansion? A: The current 10-15% non-compliance rate would translate to 2-3 additional failing clubs, making the licensing system unenforceable.
Every time a club withdraws from V.League, another drop of ink stains the league's verdict. Quang Nam left the game after successfully avoiding relegation, Thanh Hoa nearly went bankrupt and had to be rescued by local authorities. These events are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a financial governance system on the brink. Yet, in that context, the Vietnam Football Federation (VFF) and the Vietnam Professional Football Joint Stock Company (VPF) are still pursuing a plan to expand V.League to 16-18 clubs by 2027. An ambitious plan, but is it feasible?
In my years of following V.League, I have noticed a paradox: the league has more and more professionally exciting matches, but the financial foundations of the clubs are increasingly fragile. The number of clubs is not the only measure of quality, but it is the most visible one. And when quantity increases without a corresponding rise in quality, the league will enter a state of "inflation without substance."
Context: What is the expansion for?
V.League currently has 14 clubs, playing 26 rounds (double round-robin). The plan to expand to 16 or 18 teams would increase the number of matches to 30 or 34 rounds, not including the National Cup and play-offs. The stated goals are to increase the number of matches, create more opportunities for young players, and enhance the league's competitiveness. However, the question is: will the quality of the league improve accordingly?
To answer, we need to look at how regional football leagues operate. Thailand has 16 clubs but only plays 30 rounds. Malaysia has 12 clubs. Indonesia has 18 clubs. Japan has 20 clubs, playing 38 rounds. South Korea has 12 clubs but still achieves 38 rounds thanks to a split format. This shows that the number of clubs is not the determining factor for match volume or league quality. It is possible to design a format to increase matches without expansion, such as a split format. This is a solution that the original commentary did not mention, but it is cheaper to organize and less risky. For example, keeping 14 clubs but splitting them into two groups (top 8 and bottom 6) after the first leg, with each group playing a single round-robin in the second leg, would add 6-8 rounds without adding clubs. This increases matches and competitiveness in both the top and bottom groups, without facing the licensing challenges of new clubs.
However, expansion also has its benefits. Four new clubs would create about 100-120 professional squad places, equivalent to 500-700 minutes of playing time per round for young players. For a league where youth products are often blocked by import-dependent squads, this is the clearest sporting benefit. But this benefit is only meaningful if the new clubs have sufficient financial capacity and infrastructure to compete healthily. Otherwise, they will just be makeweight teams, reducing the overall quality of the league.
Core: The issue is not the number of clubs, but the number of financially healthy clubs
A professional football club cannot survive on faith. According to information from the commentary, Mr. Duc spent 2,000 billion VND over 20 years to sustain Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL). This figure is equivalent to about 3.8-4.0 million USD per year, an average budget level in V.League. But what is notable is that despite continuous investment, HAGL still experienced a decade of decline. This shows that the problem is not just money, but governance. HAGL is a typical case of the "one patron, one club" model: surviving on the resources of a single individual, but unable to develop sustainably due to the lack of professional governance mechanisms and independent revenue sources.
This model cannot scale because the number of patrons willing to absorb losses is limited. Meanwhile, local budgets are the lifeblood of many clubs like Thanh Hoa, SLNA, and Hai Phong. But this is an unsustainable funding source, dependent on fiscal policy and local leadership. When Quang Nam withdrew, they could not find a replacement source. When Thanh Hoa nearly went bankrupt, local authorities had to step in. These are signs that the system is operating on "administrative survival" rather than market capability. Local budget funding is a contingent liability, not equity. When budgets tighten or leadership changes, a club can lose its lifeline in a short period.
According to my calculations, if expanded to 18 clubs, the league would have 34 rounds, or about 38-41 matches per season per club (including the National Cup). This is a large volume of matches, requiring corresponding upgrades in medical staff, fitness, and facilities. Meanwhile, many current clubs cannot even meet basic criteria for stadiums, locker rooms, and medical care. Increasing matches without improving infrastructure will lead to more injuries, lower match quality, and increased risk of negativity.
The risk of quality dilution is real, especially in scarce positions such as goalkeepers, centre-backs, and creative midfielders. Vietnam has long had a limited supply in these positions. When four more clubs are added, demand for these positions increases, but supply does not increase correspondingly. As a result, clubs will have to use underqualified players or import more foreign players of lower quality. Neither is beneficial for the development of Vietnamese football. This is why expansion must be accompanied by a proper talent development strategy, not just an increase in the number of teams.
Licensing: When regulations are not enforced
One of the critical weaknesses of V.League is the licensing system. In 2026, two clubs were penalized for failing to meet criteria. By 2026, two other clubs were granted conditional licenses. The current non-compliance rate is about 10-15%, or 1.5-2 clubs out of 14. If expanded to 18 clubs with a similar rate, there would be an additional 2-3 non-compliant clubs. At that point, the licensing system would either become unenforceable or force relegation by administrative decision. Both are disastrous for the league's credibility.
Article 12 does not explain the incident; it only determines who bears responsibility. Similarly, the V.League licensing system does not explain why clubs have fallen into this state, but only indicates that VFF and VPF have failed to enforce regulations properly. Conditional licensing is a soft sanction, but it transfers risk to the integrity of the league. A club withdrawing mid-season will affect the results and credibility of the entire system. Quang Nam is a typical example: they left after surviving relegation, and no sanction was strong enough to prevent it.
Moreover, conditional licensing reflects a larger risk: the dominance of interest groups in league governance. When a club does not meet criteria but is still allowed to participate, it means the criteria have been relaxed for political or commercial reasons. This is a sign of "regulatory capture" – the phenomenon where a regulatory body is influenced by the entities it is supposed to regulate. In football, this often leads to decisions being made not for the benefit of the league, but for the benefit of a group of clubs.
The gap between the 2027 roadmap and the current reality is large. A plan to reach 16-18 clubs within one to three seasons, from a baseline where two clubs hold only conditional licenses, requires an unprecedented improvement in club finance, precisely when the commentary documents deterioration.
Club tiers: Financial model determines position
V.League clubs can be divided into three groups based on financial model: those funded by corporations or patrons (such as HAGL, clubs associated with Mr. Hien), those funded by local budgets (Thanh Hoa, SLNA, Hai Phong), and those based on academies but still dependent on patrons (HAGL). A club's sporting position typically lags its financial position by one to two seasons. This means any change in funding sources will directly affect match results.
The weakest link in any expansion plan is the 13th to 18th clubs. These are teams whose budgets, stadiums, and medical departments are closer to the First Division than to V.League. This is also where the risk of quality dilution and negativity concentrates. Without a strict monitoring mechanism, these clubs could become the league's "black holes," where financial and governance problems are never resolved.
Multi-club ownership is also a risk. In 2026, the dispute between Mr. Kien and Mr. Hien over multi-club sponsorship showed that the concentration of power in a few individuals can reduce the number of independent decisions. A 16-18 club league needs more independent decisions, not fewer. If new clubs are also part of the existing patrons' ecosystems, expansion will not create competition but only greater concentration.
Contrarian view: The motive for expansion may not be development
There is a hypothesis worth considering: expansion may stem from commercial and political motives rather than sporting development. A larger league creates more matches, meaning more broadcast hours, more sponsors, and importantly, more members with voting rights in VPF. In a system where power is concentrated among patrons, increasing the number of clubs could be a way to shift the voting balance. This is a politically rational motive, but it does not necessarily benefit football quality.
Furthermore, the conflict of interest issue has existed since 2026, when Mr. Kien and Mr. Hien disputed multi-club sponsorship. More than a decade later, this issue remains unresolved. The author of the commentary called it "playing football while blowing the whistle" – a figurative way of saying that league administrators also own clubs. If this issue is not resolved, expansion will only increase the number of stakeholders, making governance more complex.
In Vietnamese football, the transfer market is a match without a referee, until someone files a lawsuit. But even when a lawsuit is filed, the dispute resolution system is not strong enough. Cases like Quang Nam's withdrawal or Thanh Hoa's near-bankruptcy are usually resolved through administrative agreements, not transparent legal processes. This creates an unstable football business environment, deterring potential investors.
Another point to note: the original commentary does not mention any new revenue sources that could fund expansion. There is no plan to increase revenue from broadcasting rights, no new sponsors, no reform of revenue distribution. This means expansion will only increase costs while revenue remains unchanged. In a league where clubs already depend on local budgets and patrons, expansion will be an additional burden on public budgets and wealthy individuals. This is not a sustainable development strategy.
The public opinion cycle in V.League is not a results cycle, but a credibility cycle. Events such as Quang Nam's withdrawal, Thanh Hoa's near-bankruptcy, and the licensing penalties of 2026 and 2026 show a persistent negative trend with no sign of improvement. Each such event erodes the trust of fans and investors. Meanwhile, patrons act as agenda-setters rather than independent regulators. This creates a loop: power is concentrated among club owners, and decisions are made to protect their interests, not to improve league quality.
Conclusion: Governance reform is needed before expansion
Football does not lack rules; it lacks people who read the rules in the language of the rules. V.League has enough regulations on licensing, finance, and conflict of interest. But enforcement is weak. Before thinking about expanding to 16-18 clubs, VFF and VPF need to address three core issues: first, ensure all current clubs meet licensing criteria; second, establish a centralized revenue distribution mechanism to reduce dependence on local budgets and patrons; third, thoroughly resolve the conflict of interest issue in league governance.
Otherwise, expansion will just be an addition in quantity while quality continues to decline. An 18-club league with 4-5 financially incapable teams will be an empty league. And at that point, fans will no longer care about the numbers, but will only remember the withdrawals, the administrative verdicts, and the unpaid wages.
Can V.League expand when its clubs cannot even meet the conditions to exist? The answer lies in whether the administrators dare to put quality above quantity. And that answer will be verified not by the number of clubs, but by the number of clubs that can survive without state rescue or a single patron.
